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The current [clerkship] system is not a pure or efficient market. In fact,
the closest market analogy would be a once-a-year shopping spree in
which hundreds of shoppers, each with different amounts of money,
enter the corner grocery at different times and buy goods that are only
partially visible, that are each unique, and whose prices and brand names
1
may not reflect their true value.

I. INTRODUCTION
The process of applying to judicial clerkships is a well-known rite of
passage for many law students. It brings equal measures of excitement and
dread for students as they vie for prestigious clerkships and results in
professors sending endless numbers of recommendation letters. Although
there are 874 sitting federal judges2 with clerkships up for grabs each year,
one clerkship seems to rule them all: the Supreme Court clerkship. Many
aspects of the Supreme Court clerkship process have been carefully
studied, including: the race, sex, and political ideology of the clerk pool3
and the efficiency (or lack thereof) of the clerkship selection process.4 But
only recently has the conversation turned to the study of “feeder judges,”
those Court of Appeals judges who send their clerks on to clerk for the
Supreme Court.
I examined one aspect of the feeder phenomenon that has not received
any attention: the underrepresentation of female appellate judges as feeder
judges. To date, scholars have discussed the history of the clerkship
process and empirical studies have focused on proving the feeder
phenomenon exists and analyzing whether the particular judges from whom

1. Trenton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship Selection Process: An Applicant’s
Perspective on Bad Apples, Sour Grapes, and Fruitful Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 765,
783 (1993).
2. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., History of the Federal Judiciary: Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FEDERAL JUDICIARY CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015)
[hereinafter Biographical Directory of Federal Judges] (listing all sitting Article III
judges, both active and senior status).
3. See Christopher R. Benson, A Renewed Call for Diversity Among Supreme
Court Clerks: How a Diverse Body of Clerks Can Aid the High Court as an Institution,
23 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 23, 25-26 (2007).
4. See Richard A. Posner et al., The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 799-800 (2001).
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justices take clerks reflect ideological polarization.5 This paper builds upon
those previous works and contributes extensive new empirical data to the
study of feeder judges. While some may argue that this concern over
Supreme Court clerks and feeder judges is an act of legal navel-gazing,
Ditslear and Baum give a compelling justification for the study of the
feeder system specifically:
It could be argued that there is no need for a more extensive analysis of
the feeder phenomenon: it is a curiosity and nothing more. We think
otherwise. The selection of law clerks, including the use of a feeder
system, provides a window on the justices’ behavior. By learning what
matters to the justices when they select clerks, we also learn about their
goals as decision makers and the ways they make choices. The extent to
which a feeder system exists and the attributes of that system also tell us
about the linkages between justices and the judges who serve one level
6
below them in the federal judiciary.

Therefore, in order to examine this system, my analysis begins in 1970,
the first year that a female judge sent a clerk to the Supreme Court,7 and
continues through 2014, the last year of complete clerk data. I first
examined whether female judges were underrepresented as feeders
compared to their proportion of the federal appellate bench - the data
revealed that until 1994 women had roughly demographically proportionate
representation. But in 1994 there was a sudden sharp decline in female
feeders, and their numbers have never recovered. Ironically, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg caused this decline in female feeders – her elevation to the
Supreme Court meant that the federal appellate bench lost its biggest
female feeder ever.8
I then investigated why female judges were unable to fill the void left by
Justice Ginsburg’s elevation. For this period, I collected demographic data
on over one thousand Supreme Court clerks, the twenty-three Supreme
Court justices and nearly two hundred appellate judges they clerked for,
and the more than five hundred judges who sat on the federal appellate
bench during this period. I then ran regression analyses to determine what
measurable factors of an appellate court judge – including age, race, tenure
on the bench, party of the nominating President, sex, circuit, having been a
5. See infra Part II(d).
6. Lawrence Baum & Corey Ditslear, Supreme Court Clerkships and “Feeder”

Judges, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 26, 28 (2013).
7. Alexandra G. Hess, Analysis of Supreme Court Feeder System, 1970-2014
(unpublished data, on file with author). Judge Shirley Hufstedler of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sent a clerk to Chief Justice Burger.
8. See infra Part III-IV.
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former Supreme Court clerk, and having previously sent a clerk to the
Supreme Court – affected their chance of sending a clerk to the Supreme
Court. I also examined whether the time between a judge’s confirmation to
the appellate bench and first feeding a clerk to the Supreme Court could
explain the gender gap. (It does not.)9 The regression results revealed, in
part, that for all judges, having been a Supreme Court clerk and previously
sending a clerk to the Court had the largest positive effect on sending a
future clerk to the Supreme Court. However, for female appellate judges,
sending a clerk to the Court had a large negative impact on sending a
second clerk.10
To examine this striking result, I created a breakdown of all feeder
judges by the number of clerks they sent to the Court in a given five-year
period. This revealed that since 1970, a small number of judges have sent
an increasingly large percentage of Supreme Court clerks. For example, in
the last five years, eleven judges supplied over 70% of Supreme Court
clerks and 90% of all Supreme Court clerks were fed by a total of twenty
judges. I then looked at the gender of these “super-feeder” judges. Of the
eleven judges that sent 70% of the clerks, none were women. Of the
twenty that sent 90% of the clerks, two were women. This evidence
provides an important part of the explanation for why women have been
unable to reestablish themselves as consistent feeders to the Supreme Court
– women are essentially marginalized by the “super-feeders,” a small pool
of judges that sends the vast majority of clerks to the Supreme Court.11
Thus, the data shows that two factors have contributed to the gender gap:
first, the elevation of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court
left a void in the female feeder pool; and second, the ever increasing
importance of “super-feeders” has prevented female judges from filling that
void. The data demonstrates that increasingly the justices value clerks
from the same small set of overwhelmingly white, male judges. This is
driven, in part, by ideological needs and the need to find a method of
winnowing the vast applicant pool. But this underrepresentation of women
as feeder judges is also part of a larger narrative of women’s absence or
marginalization in other elite areas, such as law firm partnership,12
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part VIII.
See infra Parts V-VII.
See infra Part IX.
See Jennifer Smith, Female Lawyers Still Battle Gender Bias, WALL ST. J.,
(May 4, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303948104579537814028747376;
Deborah L. Rhode, Law is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And Lawyers
Aren’t Doing Enough to Change That, WASH. POST, (May 27, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-
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Supreme Court clerks,13 Supreme Court litigators,14 federal judges,15 et
cetera. Women are being shut out of what are considered positions of
status, and this paper highlights one more such area. However, it is not
only women who are affected by these findings. Rather, the entire legal
profession is affected when such a narrow class of people controls so many
facets of legal life.
II. TERMINOLOGY
It is important to note that the term ‘feeder judge’ does not have a single
definition. Some sources use it to describe any judge that has ever sent a
clerk to the Supreme Court,16 while others limit the term to those who
regularly send clerks.17 In one study, the authors note that although they
“cannot define a feeder system with precision, we can say that such a
system exists if the distribution of Supreme Court law clerks across Court
of Appeals judges is far more concentrated than it would be if there were a
random distribution of clerks from judges to justices.”18 In this paper, I use
the term ‘feeder judge’ to refer to any judge who has ever sent a clerk to
the Supreme Court and the term ‘super-feeder’ to refer to judges who send
an average of at least one clerk per term in a five-year period.19 Two
diverse-profession-in-the-nation-and-lawyers-arent-doing-enough-to-change-that/
(noting that “women account for only 17 percent of equity partners, and only seven of
the nation’s 100 largest firms have a woman as chairman or managing partner”).
13. See Erin B. Kaheny et al., High Court Recruitment of Female Clerks: A
Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada,
00 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2015). In fact, one could argue that the feeder system is partly
responsible for the underrepresentation of female clerks on the Supreme Court. See
infra Conclusion.
14. See Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, At America’s Court of Last
Resort, a Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/.
15. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Women of the Courts Symposium: Not from Central
Casting: The Amazing Rise of Women in the American Judiciary, 36 U. TOL. L. REV.
953, 956 (2005).
16. See Christopher D. Kromphardt, Fielding an Excellent Team: Law Clerk
Selection and Chambers Structure of the U.S. Supreme Court, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 289,
297 (2014). Most newspaper sources also use this definition.
17. See David H. Kaye & Joseph L. Gastwrith, Where Have All the Women Gone?
The Gender Gap in Supreme Court Clerkships, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 411, 418 (2009)
(defining major feeder judges “as those who have supplied the Justices with at least ten
law clerks” over a ten year span).
18. Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 29.
19. Other sources have used the term “major feeder” to refer to judges who send
an average of one clerk per term. I use this term interchangeably with “super-feeder”
or “elite feeder.”
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further terms merit definition: “feeding” refers to a judge sending a clerk to
the Supreme Court, and “self-feeding,” a term that I have coined here,
refers to when a former appellate court judge, elevated to the Supreme
Court, hires his or her former appellate clerks as Supreme Court clerks.
III. THE CREATION OF THE ‘FEEDER’ CLERKSHIP
Understanding the historical causes of the feeder clerkship helps explain
why the current Supreme Court clerkship system is based on an evershrinking pool of repeat players. The feeder phenomenon seems to have
arisen from a confluence of circumstances in the 1950s and 1960s: the
increasing Supreme Court applicant pool,20 the increasing prestige of a
Supreme Court clerkship,21 and Chief Justice Burger’s stated preference for
clerks with prior clerkship experience.22 Some social scientists claim that
an increasing politicization of the Supreme Court has also been a factor.23
In one sense, the increase in the prestige of Supreme Court clerkship has
created a competitive environment in which Court of Appeals judges and
clerks are both looking to maximize the likelihood that the Court will hire
the clerk. But the increase in the applicant pool has also created top-down
pressure on the justices to develop a method for winnowing candidates
without evaluating each one individually. As some have described the
current clerkship process, there is now a “general musical chairs” quality in
which there are “too many accomplished and attractive backsides for too
few desirable seats.”24 Thus, while the feeder judges increase their own
status by sending clerks to the Supreme Court, they also serve a practical
function to the justices.25
A. Increasing Applicant Pool
The first reason for the emergence of the feeder phenomenon is the
expansion of the Supreme Court clerk applicant pool. Although Justice
O’Connor is quoted as remarking, “[w]e have a luxury of riches when it
comes to applicants,”26 this is a relatively recent phenomenon. Rather, until
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part II(a).
See infra Part II(b).
See infra Part II(c).
See infra Part II(d).
Ross E. Davies, Feeding the Right Stuff: Would You Clerk for Learned Hand?,
3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 187, 189 (2013).
25. If this is true, however, that then leads to a whole new series of fairness
questions about how that pool of trusted judges is created and who they are. This will
be further explored in Part IX.
26. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 55 (2007) [hereinafter WARD
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the 1950s,
[t]he number of applications the justices received from prospective
clerks and their recommenders was generally manageable from the
institution’s inception through the Warren Court. . . . Often it was the
justice who actively sought a clerk through contacts with friends,
colleagues, law professors, and judges. . . . What is perhaps most
surprising, however, is that each justice received very few applications
27
and had very few applicants recommended to them during this period.

In fact, some clerks were selected solely on these recommendations and
never sent a formal application. The application pool was so manageable
that Justice Black corresponded personally with each applicant, “[b]ut as
the number of applications doubled, and tripled, he could not meet the
demand.”28 In 1968, he wrote, “so many applications have come to me this
year that I have reluctantly been driven to writing a form letter in reply . . .
the job of selecting clerks is probably my most difficult one, simply
because I have to turn down so many well qualified people.”29 Justice
Powell agreed with the sentiment; in 1977 he wrote, “[t]he selection
process becomes both more difficult and ‘chancy’ each year, as the number
of applicants increases.”30 The applicant pool expanded continuously
through the Burger and Rehnquist courts and, as of 2009, “more than one
thousand applicants apply each year for less than a handful of spots per
chamber.”31
Furthermore, prospective clerks used to apply only to the justices for
whom they actually wanted to work.32 However, custom has evolved and it
is now considered polite to apply to all nine active justices and all three
retired justices, regardless of interest level. As one clerk commented, “I
was selective – I applied to only nine justices.”33 With this proliferation of
applicants, clerk selection has become an unwieldy process. In an
& WEIDEN].
27. Id. at 56.
28. Id. at 57.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Adam Liptak, A Sign of the Court’s Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/us/politics/07clerks.html.
The Supreme Court does not release data on its applicants so the exact number is
unknown.
32. John J. Szmer, Erin B. Kaheny, & Robert K. Christensen, Taking a Dip in the
Supreme Court Clerk Pool: Gender-Based Discrimination in Clerk Selection, 98
MARQ. L. REV. 261, 286 (2014).
33. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 58.
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interview, Justice O’Connor commented, “[i]t takes considerable time to
look [the applications] over with extreme care. I look at the courses they
have taken, their grades, their honors achieved.”34 Yet she might, and
likely does, spend this time on applicants who are not actively interested in
clerking for her. Even with a diminishing caseload,35 this is not necessarily
an activity on which the justices want to spend an extensive amount of
time. This increased workload in regard to selecting clerks explains the
desire to rely on the recommendations of trusted colleagues, therefore
turning to ‘super-feeders’ to fill their ranks reliably.
B. Increasing Prestige of the Supreme Court Clerkship
This feeder system is a dramatic change from 1882 when Justice Horace
Gray hired the Court’s very first clerk. The modern conception of a
clerkship developed in the 1920s when the justices’ workload expanded
and clerks “acted less as personal secretaries and takers of dictation and
started being asked to do more legal research.”36 Beginning in 1924, each
justice could hire one clerk. The number expanded to two clerks per year
in 1940, three in 1970, and then the current four in 1974.37
In recent times, a Supreme Court clerkship has become a prestigious and
valuable credential for students and a status symbol for judges. Even from
the earliest days, Supreme Court clerks tended to come from elite law
schools – in fact, 45% of all Supreme Court clerks from 1882 to 2002 came
from Yale Law School and Harvard Law School38; in addition, almost 90%
of clerks over the last four decades have come from sixteen law schools.39
But, before the 1950s, the justices still had to actively reach out to find
applicants; now, they are inundated with them. In fact, before Chief Justice
Burger joined the court, it was considered “excessive” to do more than one
clerkship.40 As Judge Wald explains, “there were fewer judges, and fewer
clerkships; judges had one, later two clerks; judges’ caseloads were lighter,
their dependence on clerks less critical. Because of the small numbers, a
clerkship, though always a valuable career asset, was not considered as
crucial to certain careers in the law, like teaching, as it apparently is
34. Id. at 55.
35. See Liptak, supra, note 31.
36. Clare Cushman, Foreword to IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW

CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES, ix (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward eds., Univ. of
Virginia Press 2012).
37. David J. Garrow, Acolytes in Arms, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 401, 412 (2006).
38. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 72.
39. Mark R. Brown, Gender Discrimination in the Supreme Court’s Clerkship
Selection Process, 75 OR. L. REV. 359, 365 (1996).
40. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 78.
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now.”41 But, as Ward and Weiden note:
As clerkships grew in prestige as stepping-stones to promising careers in
prestigious law firms, government agencies, and the legal academy,
applicants sought ways of improving their chances of landing a position
on the Court. Graduating at the top of one’s class from an elite law
school no longer guaranteed a spot on the High Court. By gaining
experience on a lower court, and securing a favorable recommendation
42
from their judge, applicants became more attractive to the justices.

Thus, one of the primary reasons driving this increase in applications is
the ever-increasing value placed on a Supreme Court clerkship. Law firms
offer recent Supreme Court clerks bonuses of upwards of $300,00043 and
many members of elite law school faculty are former clerks.44 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court bar tends to be composed of Supreme Court clerks. A
2014 study found that from 2004 to 2012, “[sixty-six lawyers,] far less than
one percent of lawyers who filed appeals to the Supreme Court . . . were
involved in forty-three percent of the cases the high court chose to
decide.”45 Significantly, of those sixty-six, thirty-one were former
Supreme Court clerks.46 It has become more necessary or helpful for
certain legal positions – for example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
recently hired five former Supreme Court clerks.47 Hopeful students have
needed ways to best position themselves to get the job. This has created a
marketplace for judges to establish and advertise themselves as the person
most capable of placing a clerk.
Although some compare students’ search for feeder clerkships to “sheiks
looking for luxury cars,” this increasing sense of prestige has not only
caused a rat race among students, but judges as well.48 In 2011, there were
41. Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152, 155 (1990).
42. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 78.
43. Law Firm Signing Bonuses: Supreme Desire, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 17,

2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21583667-curiously-strong-marketsupreme-court-clerks-supreme-desire.
44. See Beverly B. Cook, Women Judges: A Preface to Their History, 14 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 573, 593-94 (1984).
45. Biskupic, Roberts & Shiffman, supra note 14.
46. Id.
47. John Shiffman, Chamber of Commerce Forms its Own Elite Law Team,
REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/08/us-scotus-firmschamber-idUSKBN0JM10Q20141208.
48. David Margolick, Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, with Judicial
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
1989),
Decorum
Left
in
the
Dust,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/17/us/law-bar-annual-race-for-clerks-becomes-mad-
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382,828 electronic applications filed to fill clerk positions for the 874
presidentially appointed federal judges.49 For some, such as the retired
Judge Wald, the stakes for finding good clerks are high, “[t]he judge –
clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually dependent one I know of
outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair. . . . [A]n excellent versus
a mediocre team of clerks makes a huge difference in the judge’s daily life
and in her work product.”50 Other judges “want to attract applicants who
will go on to clerk at the Supreme Court, not only because of the intrinsic
value of these clerks as a result of their high ability, but also because such
applicants have instrumental value to the hiring judge in that they make the
judge more attractive to future candidates.”51 In an infamous law review
article, Judge Alex Kozinski explained the relationship between judge and
clerk:
Judge and law clerk are in fact tethered together by an invisible cord for
the rest of their mutual careers. The judge will forever appear on the
clerk’s resume as his first permanent professional employer; she will
receive many inquiries about the clerk’s performance and character. The
law clerk is the judge’s emissary to the world; although sworn to secrecy
about the court’s substantive work, clerks often comment, expressly or
by knit of the brow, about the character, work habits, fairness and
52
generosity of the judges they clerked for.

This conception of clerk as “emissary” is why some judges, such as
Judge Kozinski, battle for the clerks that they believe they can send to the
Supreme Court. It can be a battle for prestige, as “the myth of the superstar
clerk lives on, and like the pied piper continues to lure pursuing judges.”53
Judge Kozinski himself has joked that he starts recruiting “at birth” and
believes that, for him, “It’s a constant job of selling yourself. . . . You may
be the greatest judge since Learned Hand, but the person I’m interviewing
wouldn’t necessarily know Learned Hand from Learned Foot.”54 In fact, a
1989 New York Times article described Judge Kozinski’s varying
recruitment methods, from “beating [prospective clerks] at poker, losing to

dash-with-judicial-decorum-left-dust.html.
49. Catherine Rampell, Judges Compete for Law Clerks on a Lawless Terrain,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/business/judgescompete-for-law-clerks-on-a-lawless-terrain.html.
50. Kromphardt, supra note 16, at 295.
51. Posner et al., supra note 4, at 875.
52. Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707, 1709 (1991).
53. Wald, supra note 41, at 155.
54. Margolick, supra note 48.
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them at chess, calling them during ski vacations, introducing [them] to
current clerks, wining and dining, bageling and loxing.”55 And while Judge
Kozinski’s tactics may be unique – especially considering he has sent the
highest number of clerks to the Supreme Court56 – they illustrate that it is
not only the clerks who are striving to get to the High Court, but some
judges as well. As one faculty clerkship adviser, Joan Larsen, at the
University of Michigan described it, “I have had a feeder judge say to me,
‘Yes, Joan, I’m sure he would be a great clerk, but I can’t send him
upstairs.’”57
Like the Supreme Court clerkship itself, this “frenzied mating ritual”58 of
feeder clerks and clerkships is driven, in part, by prestige:
A judge’s reputation among his own colleagues may in part reflect his
ability to garner the most highly-credentialed clerks under his banner so
that he can maintain a reputation as a “feeder” of clerks to the Supreme
Court. Correlatively, the stronger an appellate (or a district) judge’s
reputation for channeling clerks to the high court, the more attractive he
will be to many understandably ambitious, qualified clerk applicants.
Some judges have long friendships with justices so that their clerks have
an edge simply by virtue of that relationship. Others become feeders
because they consistently are able to recruit the law review editors and
top students from prestigious schools; not surprisingly, they want to keep
59
it that way.

While I will later discuss how and why certain judges become feeder
judges, it is clear that status is a driving factor. With the ever earlier hiring
of clerks, some students are being selected for feeder clerkships before they
even have a full year’s worth of grades.60 And rather than an applicant’s
performance as a clerk determining a recommendation for a Supreme Court
clerkship, “the letter has been replaced by the clerkship itself. . . . [S]imply
securing a clerkship with one of the top feeder judges on the courts of
appeals virtually guarantees the applicant a Supreme Court clerkship.”61
But some judges opt out, choosing clerks through non-traditional criteria

55. Id.
56. See infra Table 2 (noting that although Judge Kozinski has sent the greatest

number of clerks in absolute numbers, he does not have the highest feeding average per
Term).
57. Rampell, supra note 49.
58. Norris, supra note 1, at 776.
59. Davies, supra note 24, at 188.
60. Posner et al., supra note 4, at 802-03.
61. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 77.
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or hiring clerks who lack certain Supreme Court benchmarks, such as not
being on a school’s flagship journal. And others, such as Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit, seem to deride the competition for clerks –
although he himself has sent twenty-nine clerks to the Supreme Court as of
2014.62 Judge Posner has noted, “It’s a little humiliating that judges are so
desperate for these young people, who you would think would play only a
peripheral role in a system. But ambitious judges realize that law clerks
help them attain their ambitions. People want the best ghostwriters.”63
This apparent symbiosis between clerk and judge helps explain why tracing
the conduits through which clerks reach the Supreme Court, as well as the
power implicit in these relationships, is something worth exploring.
C. The Impact of Chief Justice Burger
Considering the application process through this lens, it might make
sense that as the applicant pool is ever increasing, the justices are
essentially outsourcing the winnowing process to lower court judges and
the lower court judges are competing to send the greatest number of clerks
possible. But the growth in feeders has also been shaped by the changing
needs of the justices themselves. In the 1940s and 1950s, rarely did a
Supreme Court law clerk have previous clerkship experience.64 From 1945
to 1949, only 23% of clerks had a lower court clerkship; from 1950 to
1960, that percentage dropped to 17.6%.65 And unlike the contemporary
feeder clerkship, potential clerks frequently worked for district court judges
rather than appellate judges. From 1979 to 1994, Judge Louis Pollak of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania sent eleven clerks straight to the Supreme
Court without an intermediate appellate court clerkship. Between 1984 and
1997, Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer of the District of Columbia sent eight
clerks in the same fashion. According to Ward and Weiden, “in the 19761985 terms, among the Supreme Court clerks who had served in lower
courts, forty-five percent came from the district courts or (much less often)
from state courts. In the 1995-2009 terms that proportion dropped to two
percent.”66 By the Rehnquist Court, this dropped further to less than one
percent.67
62. Hess, supra note 7.
63. Margolick, supra note 48.
64. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND

INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 31 (Stan. Univ. Press 2006).
65. Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme Court Clerk Data, 1944-2015 (unpublished data,
on file with author). However, the number of clerks also increased during these two
periods.
66. Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 26.
67. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 79.
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While the number of applications may have increased starting in the
1950s, appellate clerkships were not yet clearly mandatory, as only a little
more than half of Supreme Court clerks had a prior clerkship. However,
when Chief Justice Warren Burger came to the bench in 1969, the rate of
appellate clerkships among Supreme Court clerks began to rise
dramatically. As Ward and Weiden note, “Chief Justice Burger wanted law
clerks who had previously clerked in the federal judiciary, and the other
Burger Court justices quickly took notice. During the first five years of the
Burger Court, sixty-eight percent of law clerks surveyed had clerked for a
federal or state court judge. From 1980 to 1985 that percentage had
swelled to ninety-five percent of clerks surveyed.”68 By the Rehnquist
Court, ninety-eight percent of clerks had prior clerkship experience, and
ninety-two percent had clerked for a Federal Court of Appeals judge.69
Table 1 shows the overall rise in federal appellate clerkships for the
period from 1965 to 2014.70 I first determined the number of clerks with
prior appellate court clerkships during a five-year period and then divided
that by the total number of Supreme Court clerks in the given period to
calculate the percentage of clerks with prior appellate clerkships.
Table 1: Supreme Court Clerks and Prior Clerkship Experience,
1965-2014
Table 1: Supreme Court Clerks and Prior Clerkship Experience, 1965-2014
Total Number of
Percentage of
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Total Number of
Clerks with a Prior
Clerks with Prior
Supreme Court
Clerks
Period
Appellate Clerkship
Appellate Clerkships
19
73
26%
1965-69
61
128
48%
1970-74
100
135
74%
1975-79
123
149
83%
1980-84
141
166
85%
1985-89
165
189
87%
1990-94
168
176
95%
1995-99
174
175
99%
2000-04
194
194
100%
2005-09
195
195
100%
2010-14

68. PEPPERS, supra note 64, at 31.
69. Id.
70. Hess, supra note 65. However, the number of clerks also increased during

these two periods. I included the period from 1965 to 1969 to show the impact of
Chief Justice Burger joining the Court.
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Chief Justice Burger joined the Court in 1969 and this table demonstrates
the clear increase in appellate court clerkships since his tenure on the
bench. In the five years prior to Chief Justice Burger’s commission, only
twenty-six percent of Supreme Court clerks had a prior appellate clerkship.
This percentage nearly doubled in the first five years of the Chief Justice’s
tenure and that number has consistently reached one hundred percent since
2005. In fact, not only has a feeder clerkship become a requirement, but
some students also seem to be clerking for multiple Court of Appeals
judges in the hopes of better positioning themselves to receive a Supreme
Court clerkship. In the period from 2010 to 2014, there were 195 Supreme
Court clerks but they clerked for 207 appellate court judges; from 2005 to
2009, there were 194 Supreme Court clerks who clerked for 200 appellate
judges.71 In some instances, the students are clerking for two known feeder
judges, while in others, students are clerking for a lesser-known appellate
judges and then a more established feeder judge.72
D. Politicization of the Supreme Court
Whether the politicization of the Supreme Court is a factor in the rise of
the feeder judge is a relatively new question, but most legal professionals
and social scientists seem to agree that ideology is crucially important.
While the regression results indicate that the nominating party of a judge
does not have a statistically significant effect on their chance of sending a
clerk to the Court, the extremely high rates of same-party feeding shown in
Part VII are telling.73 With the super-majority of clerks coming from
judges of the same party, the justices are relying on a small subset of
politically-aligned judges for their clerks. This has contributed to the rise
of super feeder judges, a group that almost entirely excludes female
judges.74
Recent studies have exclusively focused on this question of polarization.
While it is not entirely clear why the polarization of the Court has occurred,
one study found that because of the increasing applicant pool and the fact
that it is customary for a prospective clerk to apply to all nine justices,
“justices cannot tell anything about applicants’ ideological leanings from
the fact that they applied. Lacking other information on that score, the
justices seem to look to the ideology of the feeder judge.”75 This is
demonstrated by the fact that, for example, one study found that between

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
See id. (referring to the author’s source on file cited in FN 71).
See infra Part VI-VII.
See infra Part IV (analyzing the exclusion of female feeder judges).
See Liptak, supra note 31 (discussing the Baum and Ditslear study).
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1975 and 1980, the “relationship between the justices’ ideological positions
and those of the judges from whom they drew their clerks was relatively
weak.”
However, by 1993–1998, “the picture was fundamentally
different” and the ideological relationships had become “very strong.”76
This increasing division along ideological position has continued to the
present day. A New York Times article from 2010 noted that from 1969 to
1986, Chief Justice Burger “hired roughly even numbers of clerks who had
worked for judges appointed by Democrats and Republicans.”77 However,
today, “the more conservative justices are much more likely than were their
predecessors to hire clerks who worked for judges appointed by
Republicans. And the more liberal justices are more likely than in the past
to hire from judges appointed by Democrats.”78 For example, in the 1986
to 1994 terms, “Justice Kennedy took 15 percent of all his clerks from
Democrats, Justice Scalia 13 percent, and Chief Justice Rehnquist 22
percent. In the 1995-2004 terms, each took 3 percent of his clerks from
Democrats.”79 Former judge J. Michael Luttig of the Fourth Circuit, who
has the highest feeder rate of clerks per term—and of his forty-two clerks
to the Supreme Court, thirty-three of them were fed to Justices Thomas and
Scalia—says that this shift toward a more politicized clerkship pool is
unsurprising and “the justices’ overall hiring practices reflected a
fundamental shift.”80 He elaborated:
As law has moved closer to mere politics, political affiliations have
naturally and predictably become proxies for the different political
agendas that have been pressed in and through the courts. Given this
politicization, it should come as no surprise to learn that the more liberal
judges tend both to hire clerks who would self-describe themselves as
Democrats and to hire clerks from other judges who would likewise selfdescribe themselves as Democrats, and vice versa for the more
81
conservative judges.

Fifteen years ago, Justice Thomas echoed a similar sentiment in more
blunt terms, “[choosing clerks is like] selecting mates in a foxhole. I won’t
hire clerks who have profound disagreements with me. It’s like trying to
train a pig. It wastes your time, and it aggravates the pig.”82
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Garrow, supra note 37, at 408.
Liptak, supra note 31.
Id.
Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 43.
Liptak, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
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Various studies seem to affirm that ideology plays “a role in both feeder
and non-feeder matches; applicants and judges alike, through conscious
and unconscious selection, show a tendency to make ideological
matches.”83 In fact, Peppers and Ward posited that failing to consider
ideology prevents people from understanding the fundamental nature of the
feeder system and what has caused its proliferation:
[M]ost discussions and numerical rankings of “feeder judges” fail to
adequately emphasize the most important and consequential element of
the phenomenon, namely how in recent decades virtually every such
jurist has been either exceptionally liberal or highly conservative. . . .
For instance, the D.C. Circuit has long enjoyed an overall numerical
advantage, but why is it that judges [Laurence] Silberman, [David]
Sentelle, and [Stephen] Williams, just like judges [David] Bazelon, [J.
Skelly] Wright and [Abner] Mikva in earlier years, score far above
equally well-respected but ideologically moderate jurists like Judith W.
Rogers? Similarly, in a national context, why have judges Luttig and
Kozinski topped the charts rather than say judges Michael Boudin, Pierre
Leval, and the late Edward Becker? The explanation is not that the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have decidedly stronger reputations than the
First, Second, or Third, nor that clerks to judges like Silberman are
decidedly more able than clerks to a Boudin or Leval. If instead the real
answer is simply that multiple justices have closer personal ties to judges
like Luttig, Silberman and Kozinski than Rogers, Boudin, and Becker,
then the justices have only themselves to blame for a “clerk force” whose
political loyalties are far more partisan than was the case in earlier
decades when clerks did not undergo the ideological socialization that
84
they now receive during their appellate clerkships.

And while some judges claim to have exempted themselves from the
ideological divide, such as Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit
(who say that he tries “not to put an ideological litmus test” on his
candidates), there is a serious concern that the rise of the feeder system is
intimately tied to politics and politicking.85 And while I will not address
whether considering ideology in choosing clerks is a net positive or
negative for the Court, it is clearly connected to the feeder system. For the
justices, the ideology of appellate court judges acts as an easy filter.86 And
among those judges of the same political party as a justice, there appears to
be a tendency to take many clerks from the same judges, the “exceptionally
83.
84.
85.
86.

Kromphardt, supra note 16, at 296.
Garrow, supra note 37, at 418.
Liptak, supra note 31.
Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 27.
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liberal or highly conservative.”87
IV. MEASURING UNDERREPRESENTATION
While there are many factors that have led to the creation of the feeder
judge system, there has not yet been an exploration of the gender imbalance
in this market. On the most basic level, I wanted to examine whether
female Court of Appeals judges were actually underrepresented as feeder
judges to the Supreme Court. As mentioned, I limited my analysis to the
years 1970 to 2014 because 1970 was the first year a female judge sent a
clerk to the Supreme Court and 2014 was the most recent term for which
full data on the clerks and their prior clerkships are available.88 The list of
clerks came from the Oyez Project and the Supreme Court, each of which
publishes a list of clerks for each justice by year.89 To determine what
prior clerkships each clerk had, I ran a simple Boolean search.90 Using this
information, I determined that there were 1,378 Supreme Court clerks91
who clerked for a Court of Appeals judge in the period from 1970-2014.92
Using the Biographical Directory of Judges, I then determined the sex of
each judge and then calculated what percentage of the feeder judges were
female in a given year.93
I then compared the percentage of female feeder judges to the percentage
of women on the federal appellate bench as a whole. This was much more
difficult because there is no list of judges on the bench in a given year.
Therefore, again using the Biographical Directory of Judges, I made a list
of each judge on each of the twelve circuits94 for each year by sex from
1970 to 2014. I included judges in my table from their year of commission
to their termination year. This yielded 9,061 observations for the period in
87. Garrow, supra note 37, at 418.
88. See Alexandra G. Hess, Court of Appeals Feeder Judge Data, 1944-2015 (Apr.

13, 2015) (unpublished data, on file with author) (limiting analysis to 2014 because the
Supreme Court has not yet completed hiring for October Term 2015).
89. See Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme Court Clerk Data, 1944-2015 (unpublished
data, on file with author).
90. Alexandra G. Hess, Court of Appeals Feeder Judge Data, 1944-2015 (April 13,
2015) (unpublished data, on file with author) (limiting analysis to 2014 because the
Supreme Court has not yet completed hiring for October Term 2015). For example, I
consulted social media sites, newspapers, legal blogs, company websites, and a variety
of other online sources in compiling the data. While this means there is some margin
of error, it is one of the most comprehensive lists to date.
91. See id.
92. However, there were about 200 unique feeder judges once I excluded repeats:
31 female feeders and 167 male feeders.
93. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 2.
94. Id. (excluding the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
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question. I then calculated the total percentage of women on the federal
appellate bench for each year.
Figure 1 below compares the percentage of women who are feeder
judges (blue line) as compared to the overall representation of women on
the federal appellate bench (red line).
Figure 1: Distribution of Female Feeder Judges, 1970-Present95
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This graph shows that from 1970 to 1994, women were actually
overrepresented as feeder judges for sixteen of those first twenty-five
years. In 1970, they were overrepresented by over 1200%, as women were
0.8% of all federal appellate judges but 12.5% of feeders.96 The sharp rise
in female judges in the late 1970s was attributable in part to President
Carter’s establishment of “commissions within each circuit to identify
95. See Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme Court Clerk Data, 1944-2015 (unpublished
data, on file with author).
96. This is due, in large part, to the small sample size because only eight clerks
previously clerked at the appellate level. By 1972, more than half of all Supreme Court
clerks had a prior appellate clerkship. See Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme Court Clerk
Data, 1944-2015 (unpublished data, on file with author).
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potential nominees for vacancies on the U.S. Court of Appeals” in an effort
to expand the presence of women and minorities on the appellate bench.97
By 1994, women comprised 28.1% of all feeder judges and were 10.9% of
all federal appellate judges. Yet, after 1994, even though the percentage of
women on the federal appellate bench continued to rise steadily, the
percentage of women as feeder judges dropped dramatically from 28.1% in
1994 to 8.6% in 1995 and has not recovered since. In 2009, the percentage
of women as feeder judges dipped as low as 4.7% but bounced back to
9.1% in 2014. This means that, as of 2014, though 75.9% of federal
appellate judges are male,98 they represent over 90% of feeder judges to the
Supreme Court.
Even if one just looks at a list of top feeders, one suspects that there
might be a gender gap. As I noted in Part II, the rise of the feeder clerkship
is relatively recent, but the number of clerks that some judges have
managed to feed to the Supreme Court is staggering. Table 2 lists the top
ten feeder judges to the Supreme Court from the period in question.
However, since there was no real feeder culture before this period, the list
also represents the biggest feeders of all-time, listed in descending order of
number of clerks.

97. DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE ON THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 27 (UNIV. OF MICH. 2000).

98. This high percentage of male appellate court judges is also a source of
controversy, but not one that I will be addressing in this paper. See Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Women of the Courts Symposium: Not from Central Casting: The Amazing
Rise of Women in the American Judiciary, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 953, 956 (2005) (“As of
July 2005, there are fifty female appellate court judges and 171 female district court
judges, comprising 17.4% of the Article III bench.”).
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Table Table
2: Top
to thetoSupreme
Court,
3: Feeder
Top Ten Judges
Feeder Judges
the Supreme
Court,1970-2014
1970-2014
Judge

Tenure

Total Clerks

Clerks Per Term

Alex Kozinski

1985-Present

58

2.00

J. Harvie Wilkinson

1984-Present

55

1.83

Merrick Garland

1997-Present

43

2.53

J. Michael Luttig

1991-2006

42

2.80

David Tatel

1994-Present

35

1.75

Harry Edwards

1980-Present

33

0.97

Guido Calabresi

1994-Present

32

1.07

Laurence Silberman

1985-Present

32

1.10

J. Skelly Wright

1962-1988

32

1.23

Michael Boudin

1992-Present

31

1.41

While I will put these super-feeders in perspective in a later section of
this paper, one can already see the huge impact these ten judges have had
on the Supreme Court clerk pool. First, all of these judges are men and
nine of the ten are white.99 Second, if one looks at the ratio of clerks per
Supreme Court term, this table shows that these judges, with the exception
of Judge Edwards, are sending, on average, at least one clerk to the
Supreme Court per term. And if one added up the overall clerk per term
ratio for all of the judges currently sitting – thus excluding J. Skelly Wright
and J. Michael Luttig – the eight remaining judges account for an average
of 12.49 clerks per term. If one assumes there is the same number of clerks
that there were in 2014, thirty-nine, then just these eight judges would
singlehandedly be responsible for over 32% of Supreme Court clerks. The
New York Times also reported on this trend in 2009, when it noted that
although there were 164 active judges on the federal appeals court, “just
four of those judges produced about 60 Supreme Court clerks over the last
six years, more than a quarter of the total.”100 As Part VIII makes clear,
99. The exception is Judge Harry Edwards, who is African American. See
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 2; see also Alexandra G. Hess,
Court of Appeals Feeder Judge Data, 1944-2015 (April 13, 2015) (unpublished data, on
file with author).
100. Adam Liptak, On the Bench and Off, the Eminently Quotable Justice Scalia,
N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12bar.html.
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however, this crude measure in fact grossly underestimates the huge impact
of super-feeders.
By contrast to Table 2, Table 3 represents just the top female feeder
judges.
Table 3: Top Female Feeder Judges to the Supreme Court,
1970-Present
Table 4: Top Ten Female Feeder
Judges to the Supreme Court, 1970-2014
Judge

Tenure

Total Clerks

Clerks/Term

Ruth Bader Ginsburg

1980-1993

17

1.31

Patricia Wald

1979-1999

16

0.80

Edith Jones

1985-Present

11

0.38

Amalya Kearse

1979-Present

11

0.31

Shirley Hufstedler

1968-1979

8

0.73

Janice R. Brown

2005-Present

7

0.78

Dorothy Nelson

1979-Present

6

0.17

Judith Rogers

1994-Present

5

0.20

Pamela Rymer

1989-2011

5

0.42

Deanell Tacha

1985-2011

5

0.19

The top female feeder judges have sent 91 clerks, less than one-fourth of
the 392 sent by the top overall feeder judges. Ruth Bader Ginsburg is the
top female feeder ever; however, the absolute number of clerks she fed to
the Court is only slightly more than half of those fed by the tenth-ranked
male feeder. She is also the only female appellate judge whose average
feeding rate exceeds one clerk per term. Nine of the top ten male feeders
beat that ratio. Furthermore, only 50% of the judges on the female top
feeder list are still sitting, in contrast to 80% of the male judges, meaning
that the female judges who are still feeding are doing so in even smaller
numbers. While I will expand on the place of female feeders, both
empirically and qualitatively, these comparisons give a glimpse into some
of the disparities in the presence of women as feeder judges.
These data may seem counterintuitive to some; there are three women on
the Supreme Court and the percentage of women on the federal bench
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continues to rise.101 But as I will discuss, two factors have contributed to
the decline of women as feeder judges: first, ironically, the confirmation of
Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court and second, the Supreme
Court’s increased reliance on a small number of appellate judges for clerks.
V. THE COLLAPSE OF THE HOUSE THAT RUTH BUILT
On August 10, 1993, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was sworn in as the second
female Supreme Court justice.102 Over the following year, the percentage
of female feeder judges almost doubled from 14.71% to 28.13% in 1994.
However, as noted, between 1994 and 1995, that percentage plummeted to
8.57%. Examining the clerk pool for those three years, it is evident that
Justice Ginsburg’s confirmation to the Supreme Court was responsible for
the decline of female feeders. Why? Because she herself was a key female
feeder judge. As discussed in Table 3, from 1980 to 1993, while she was
on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Ginsburg fed seventeen clerks to the
Supreme Court.103 Her runner-up, Judge Patricia Wald, fed sixteen clerks
during her tenure from 1979 to 1999, an average of 0.80 clerks per year.104
After 1994, when Justice Ginsburg no longer hired her own former clerks,
the only other major female feeder judge was Judge Wald, who then retired
in 1999.105 Figure 2 illustrates the effect of Justice Ginsburg’s elevation
and its singular impact: when Judge Ginsburg became Justice Ginsburg, no
other woman took her place as a ‘super-feeder’ and the proportion of
women as feeders has not recovered. One can see, for example, that even
though Justice Sotomayor was also a circuit court judge before she was
confirmed to the High Court, her confirmation did not have an impact on
the feeder pool because she had only sent one clerk to the court (in fact, to
Justice Ginsburg in 2004).106
101. See generally Schafran, supra note 15 (analyzing the increasing number of
female judges).
102. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 2.
103. Even though she was confirmed in 1993, she still fed two of her former Court
of Appeals clerks to the Supreme Court, one to herself and one to Justice O’Connor.
See Alexandra G. Hess, Court of Appeals Feeder Judge Data, 1944-2015 (April 13,
2015) (unpublished data, on file with author).
104. If one includes all of the clerks she fed to the Court, Justice Ginsburg is the
most prolific female feeder ever; however, if one excludes her self-feeds, then that
distinction belongs to Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit. See id.
105. Justice Ginsburg fed three of her former appellate clerks in her first year on the
Supreme Court, which explains why there was a spike in female feeders in her first
year and then a rapid decline. Id.
106. By contrast, Justices Kagan and O’Connor were not judges before they joined
the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, while the impact of Justice Ginsburg’s elevation is real
and has had a profound impact on female judges as feeders to the Supreme Court, the
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Figure 2: Impact of Women Being Confirmed to the Supreme Court
on the Percentage of Female Feeder Judges
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In fact, Justice Ginsburg is not only one of the biggest female feeders,
but as Table 4 demonstrates, she is also (by a slim margin) the biggest
feeder currently sitting on the Supreme Court, if one excludes self-feeds.107
She has not only sent the most clerks in terms of absolute numbers, but also
as measured by the average number of clerks sent per term.

sample size is extremely small.
107. See infra Table 4; see also supra Table 3. As noted in Table 3, Justice
Ginsburg’s average is 1.31 clerks per term if one includes self-feeds. She is also likely
the biggest feeder-turned-Supreme Court justice ever, but that is primarily due to the
fact that previous justices were lower court judges before a feeder clerkship became
essentially required during the Burger Court.
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Table 4: Current
Supreme
Justices
as Feeder
Table 6:
Supreme Court
Court Justices
as Feeder
JudgesJudges
Justice Name

Years on Court of
Appeals

Alito, Samuel A.
Breyer, Stephen G.
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
Kagan, Elena
Kennedy, Anthony M.
Roberts, John G.
Scalia, Antonin
Sotomayor, Sonia
Thomas, Clarence

16
14
13
N/A
13
2
4
11
1

Total Clerks
(excluding selffeeds)
3
10
14
N/A
4
1
4
1
1

Clerks/Term
0.19
0.71
1.10
N/A
0.31
0.50
1.00
0.09
1.00

If one compares this table to Tables 2 and 3, one can see that while
Justice Ginsburg is the biggest female feeder of all-time, the other justices
do not appear on the list at all.
VI. IS IT PURELY A QUESTION OF GENDER?
To investigate what factors other than Justice Ginsburg’s elevation are
causing the low levels of feeding by female judges, I used a regression to
determine if certain measurable factors might be affecting women’s
representation. This would hopefully shed light on the question of whether
the issue is purely gender or the interplay of other factors. The results
revealed that for female judges, tenure had a positive effect on the chances
of sending a clerk to the Court; but, in sharp contrast to male judges,
having sent one clerk to the Court sharply decreased the chances of a
female judge sending a second clerk. As I will discuss, this notable result
can be explained by the rise of super-feeders, who are almost exclusively
men and feed the super-majority of Supreme Court clerks. Thus, female
judges have the opportunity to send one clerk but are shut out from sending
multiple clerks because of the super-feeder monopoly.
A. Factors to Consider
In order to have an adequate standard of comparison, I compared the
pool of feeder judges to the entire federal appellate bench from 1970 to
2014. Using the Biographical Directory of Judges, I controlled for: year, a
judge’s circuit, gender, race, age, and tenure on the bench;108 the party of
the President that nominated the judge; whether or not the judge him or
herself was a prior Supreme Court clerk; and whether, relative to a given
108. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 2. (adjusting the age
and tenure of the judge each year).
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year, a judge had previously sent a clerk to the Supreme Court. By
controlling for these other factors, I was able to see the impact of gender on
the likelihood of an appellate judge sending a clerk to the Supreme Court.
Age, race, and gender were included as baseline demographic
characteristics. In addition, since existing literature on feeder judges
focuses primarily on the issues of political affiliation109 and circuit
favoritism,110 it was important to include those factors in the data. Tenure
on the bench goes to a similar issue of lag effects111 : it looks at how the
amount of time a judge is on the bench affects their chance of sending a
clerk to the Supreme Court. I included the question of whether a judge was
a prior Supreme Court clerk as a measurable proxy for networking effects.
Essentially, while there may be many external connections between justices
and individual judges, such as prior work connections or friendships that
result in a judge becoming a feeder, they are not measurable on a macrolevel. However, if a judge was a former clerk on the Court, that is a
measurable connection and may relate to a judge’s becoming a feeder.
Finally, the question of whether a judge had previously sent a clerk to the
Court allowed me to explore whether there is a barrier to entry to becoming
a feeder judge.
B. Methodology
The unit of observation is the “judge-year;” the dataset includes 504
judges who served on the bench for a combined 9,818 judge-years from
1970 to 2014.112
I examined three variations: the first, a “baseline,” was a logit regression
using all 9,818 judge-years of data available. Judges appointed before
1970 who remained on the bench in that year, the beginning of the dataset,
are included.
A second analysis excludes all judges who were appointed prior to 1970.
For example, a judge appointed in 1969 who retired in 1975 is excluded
from the data. I did this because clerk-hiring preferences – namely, the rise
of the feeder clerkship – changed around the beginning of the dataset.
The third variation excludes instances of a Supreme Court justice selffeeding, which is, hiring his or her former appellate court clerk. Several
recently-confirmed justices have hired many or all their most recent clerks

109.
110.
111.
112.

See supra Part II(d).
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VIII.
Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme Court Clerk Data, 1944-2015 (unpublished data,
on file with author).
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when assuming the high bench.113 The regression estimates are very
similar, indicating that the estimates in the baseline analysis are not driven
by qualitatively different and highly unusual observations.
As mentioned, the model estimates the effects of judge characteristics,
such as gender, tenure, age, race, circuit, whether the judge was nominated
by a Republican or Democratic president, and whether the judge had
previously sent a clerk to the Supreme Court, on the probability that a
judge i sends a clerk to the Supreme Court in year t. The dependent
variable takes the value 1 if the judge sent a clerk to the Supreme Court in
that year, and 0 otherwise. I ran logit regressions of the following model,
with judge characteristics grouped in a matrix to allow for cleaner notation:
𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑘 !,! = 𝛼! + 𝛽 𝐽𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠

!,!

+ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀

(1)

The regression estimates should be interpreted as the effect, in terms of
percentage, of the characteristic on the probability a feeder judge sends a
clerk to the Supreme Court.
I also considered the following model with an interaction term between
circuit and gender:
𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑘 !,! = 𝛼! + ∑𝛽 𝐽𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 !,!
+ 𝛿 𝐶𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡  ×  𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒!,! + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀                                 2
C. Results
Table 5: Regression Results for all Court of Appeals Judges,
1970-2014
Table 7: Regression Results for
all Court of Appeals Judges, 1970-2014
Characteristics of
Judge

Model 1: Baseline
(all judges and
clerks)
-0.0493***
-0.00817
-0.116
0.400**
0.115
1.204***

Age
Tenure
Female
Racial Minority
Republican
Judge was a SCOTUS
clerk
Judge previously sent
2.282***
a clerk to SCOTUS
***Significant of p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Model 2: Excludes
Judges Appointed
Prior to 1970
-0.0426***
-0.00747
-0.142
0.363**
0.119
1.306***

Model 3:
Excludes SelfFeeds
-0.0482***
-0.00891
-0.115
0.400**
0.103
1.206***

2.323***

2.285***

113. Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme Court Clerk Data, 1944-2015 (unpublished data,
on file with author).

Table 8: Regression Results for Female Court of Appeals Judges, 1970-2014
Characteristics of
Model 1: Baseline Model 2: Excludes
Model 3:
Female Judge
(all judges and
Judges Appointed Prior Excludes Selfclerks)
to 1970
Feeds
Age
-0.00293
-0.00528
-0.00306
Tenure
0.0585**
0.0648**
0.0582**
Racial Minority
-0.262
0.377
-0.278
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss1/2
Republican
0.198
0.357
0.224

26

Hess: The Collapse of the House that Ruth Built: The Impact of the Feeder System on Female Judges and the Federal Judiciary, 1970-2014
HESS 10/8/15 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

COLLAPSE OF HOUSE THAT RUTH BUILT

12/4/15 11:03 AM

87

Table 5 suggests that four characteristics have a statistically significant
effect on the probability of a Court of Appeals judge becoming a Supreme
Court feeder: age, racial minority status, the judge being a former Supreme
Court clerk, and the judge having previously sent a Supreme Court clerk.
Being a racial minority has a modest effect on sending a clerk to the Court
–ranging from 36.3% to 40.0% across the three models. Since 1970,
approximately 6.5% of appellate-turned-Supreme Court clerks have come
from a feeder judge of color, although there is no current literature as to
explain the effect.114 While the latter three characteristics have a positive
effect on becoming a feeder judge, age has a negative effect of
approximately 4.7%. There is no literature on why this negative
relationship might exist, although one could posit that once a judge takes
senior status and consequently, a potentially reduced workload, they are
then less likely to send a clerk to the Court because they have a smaller
clerk pool.115 In fact, the negative age effect and statistically insignificant
effect of tenure go against common wisdom. Judge Kozinski once claimed,
“[s]eniority matters. Judges with many years on the bench naturally have
an advantage over upstarts like me who have to work hard at achieving a
national reputation.”116 But, as Table 6 will show, tenure on the bench
only has a positive effect for female appellate judges.
However, far and away the factor that has the strongest effect – ranging
from 228.2% to 232.3% across the three models – is having previously sent
a clerk to the Supreme Court, followed in a distant second by the judge him
or herself being a former Supreme Court clerk (with an average positive
effect ranging from 120.4% to 130.6%). In many ways, it makes sense that
both of those factors are closely related to feeding a clerk. A judge who
was a former clerk might be able to send their clerks to the same justice.117
And, even if their justice is deceased, there may still be un-measurable
benefits: first, networking effects; second, a signaling function of having
previously clerked on the Court or; third, a perception that a former
114. They account for 90 of 1,379 feeder judge spots since 1970. Like women,
racial minority judges are underrepresented as feeder judges, accounting for an average
of 6.5% of feeder judges despite making up an average of 10.1% of the federal
appellate bench. See Alexandra G. Hess, Court of Appeals Feeder Judge Data, 19442015 (April 13, 2015) (unpublished data, on file with author).
115. See Honorable Frederic Block, Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge
Corrects Some Common Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 540 (2014).
116. Kozinski, supra note 52, at 1719.
117. A roundabout example of this is Judge Alex Kozinski. Although he clerked
for Chief Justice Burger, he also clerked for then-judge Kennedy. He has subsequently
fed most of his Supreme Court clerks to Justice Kennedy (28 of 58 clerks). See
Alexandra G. Hess, Court of Appeals Feeder Judge Data, 1944-2015 (April 13, 2015)
(unpublished data, on file with author).
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-0.00747
-0.00891
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-0.142
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Racial Minority
0.400**
0.363**
0.400**
Republican
Supreme
Court clerk may be0.115
uniquely positioned0.119
to identify clerks0.103
who can
118
Judge
was
a
SCOTUS
1.204***
1.306***
1.206***
handle the workload.
However, in theory, it seems even clearer why
clerk a high impact with having previously sent a clerk to the Court.
there is such
Judge previously sent
2.282***
2.323***
2.285***
If aa judge
sends a clerk that performs well, then a justice might be inclined
clerk to SCOTUS
119
to***Significant
take anotherofclerk
from
that judge.
p<0.01,
** p<0.05,
*p<0.1

I then examined whether these effects were consistent for just the female
judges. Table 6 indicates they were not:
Table 6: Regression Results for Female Court of Appeals Judges,
Table 8: Regression Results for1970-2014
Female Court of Appeals Judges, 1970-2014
Characteristics of
Female Judge
Age
Tenure
Racial Minority

Model 1: Baseline
(all judges and
clerks)
-0.00293
0.0585**
-0.262

Model 2: Excludes
Judges Appointed Prior
to 1970
-0.00528
0.0648**
0.377

Republican
0.198
0.357
Judge was a SCOTUS -1.031
-1.102*
clerk
Judge previously sent a -0.757***
-0.932***
clerk to SCOTUS
***Significant of p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Model 3:
Excludes SelfFeeds
-0.00306
0.0582**
-0.278
0.224
-1.031
-0.777***

Measured against the same metrics, the result for female judges in Table
6 is essentially the inverse of those for the entire federal appellate bench in
Table 5. While most characteristics were not statistically significant,
Table 6 reveals that a female judge’s tenure on the bench and whether she
previously sent a clerk to the Supreme Court are statistically significant in
interesting ways. Tenure has a positive effect – ranging from 5.82% to
6.48% – with sending a clerk to the Supreme Court whereas, in the overall
appellate pool, age negatively affected the chance of sending a clerk and
tenure was not statistically significant. This might support the idea of lag
effects,120 but could also suggest that it takes female judges longer to build
networks either with schools, so that professors recommend Supreme Court
118. See Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 27 (“Judges interact with current and
future justices and develop relationships with them. A justice may seek out law clerks
from a particular judge because acquaintanceship with the judge gives the justice
greater confidence in the judge’s clerks. Further, acquaintanceship facilitates the
exchange of information, making it easier for a justice to learn whether a specific clerk
has the traits that the justice seeks. On a different level, friendship in itself may be a
basis for choosing clerks from a particular judge.”).
119. See Kozinski, supra note 52, at 1718.
120. See infra Part VIII.
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caliber clerks to them, or with the justices, so that they will consider the
judge’s clerks. There is no definitive literature on the subject, however,
and might provide an avenue for further research.
The second statistically significant characteristic, whether the female
judge previously sent a clerk to the Court, is more troubling. Table 6
demonstrates that there is a large negative effect for female judges, a range
of negative 75.7% to 93.2%, who sent a clerk to the Supreme Court to send
another. This provides a sharp contrast to the sharply positive effect shown
in Table 5 for the entire federal appellate bench. While I will discuss the
likely causes of this in Part IX – in particular, the rise of the ‘super-feeders’
– this effect, combined with the statistically insignificant result for women
in Table 6, suggests that female appellate judges are able to send a clerk to
the Supreme Court but then face barriers to further entry. The positive
correlation of tenure, suggesting a longer time period needed to form
networks, combined with the negative effect of having fed a clerk to the
Supreme Court once, creates the picture of a system in which female judges
are prevented from forming a strong feeding network by the means that
male judges do.
VII. IMPACT OF CIRCUIT EFFECTS
One factor to consider is whether circuit effects, rather than gender, can
explain the regression results; specifically, whether the issue is simply that
most feeder judges come from a particular circuit. Existing literature and
common lore describe the D.C. Circuit as the most prestigious, followed by
the Ninth and Second Circuits. As Ward and Weiden note:
Even among clerks who come from the courts of appeals, there is
considerable variation. Of the twelve circuits that comprise the appeals
courts, the D.C. Circuit is by far the most prevalent stepping stone for
High Court clerks. [From 1969-2002], more than one-third of all
Supreme Court clerks come from the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. This is not surprising given that the D.C. Circuit is widely
121
considered the most prestigious appellate court.

Its prestige, they explain, is due in part to the natural access that D.C.
Circuit judges have to the justices and therefore, the greater ease with
which to forge connections for clerks: “Indeed, as with clerks, a
disproportionate number of the current justices – Scalia, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Roberts – have come to the Court following their service on
the D.C. Circuit.”122 Another factor in determining the prestige of a circuit
121. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 80.
122. Id. at 80, 83.
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is, “the disparity in the number of judges, and therefore the number of
clerks, in each circuit” as well as geographical preferences.123 This size
differential helps explain why “excluding the D.C. Circuit, more Supreme
Court clerks, currently one in five, come from the Ninth Circuit than from
any other.”124 However,
not all the variation can be explained by size alone. For example, what
accounts for the dramatic rise in clerks ascending to the Supreme Court
from the Fourth Circuit. . . . Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
did not have a dramatic increase in the number of judges and clerks
during the period under study. . . . The data suggests that the increase has
been caused by the general conservative shift that the Supreme Court has
undergone in recent years and the higher number of conservative clerks
125
now working there.

As discussed in Part II, the conservative shift in the Court and its
relationship to the clerk pool has become a major area of study. For the
purposes of this study, the reason for the circuit effects is still important,
but less so than measuring their existence. Thus, Table 7 and Table 8 look
at circuits in their entirety to determine their effect on a judge from a
particular circuit feeding a clerk to the Supreme Court.

123. Id. at 83. However, this is partially misleading causation. See supra Table 4
(noting that Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts served on the D.C. Circuit for an
extremely short period of time, one year and two years, respectively, while Justice
Scalia served for four years and Justice Ginsburg for seventeen years). Thus, it is
equally plausible, in the cases of Justices Thomas and Roberts, that they were put on
the D.C. Circuit as a way station before being put on the Court, rather than being put on
the D.C. Circuit and then being elevated to the Supreme Court by virtue of their service
to the circuit.
124. Id. at 81.
125. Id.
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Table Table
7: Circuit
Effects
forforAll
ofAppeals
Appeals
Judges,
1970-2014
9: Circuit
Effects
AllCourt
Court of
Judges,
1970-2014
Circuit (all judges)
Model 1: Baseline
Model 2: Excludes
Model 3: Excludes
(all judges and
Judges Appointed
Self-Feeds
clerks)
Prior to 1970
1st Circuit
-0.115
-1.532***
-0.363
2nd Circuit
0.395
-0.925*
0.196
3rd Circuit
-0.949*
-2.181***
-1.217**
4th Circuit
0.0127
-1.265**
-0.182
5th Circuit
-0.403
-2.010***
-0.596
6th Circuit
-1.350**
-2.652***
-1.544**
7th Circuit
-0.498
-1.760***
-0.712
8th Circuit
-1.677***
-3.006***
-1.946***
9th Circuit
-0.207
-1.407***
-0.411
10th Circuit
-1.537**
-2.782***
-1.727***
11th Circuit
-1.398**
-2.629***
-1.597***
D.C. Circuit
1.238**
-0.0739
1.026*
***Significant of p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 7 suggests that circuit effects might indeed be a factor, though not
exactly in the way that Ward and Weiden predicted. The D.C. Circuit, with
the exception of the second model, is the only circuit with an extremely
high and statistically significant positive effect. This suggests that there is
indeed a circuit that is closely tied to feeding to the Supreme Court. By
contrast, across the three models, it appears that the 3rd, 6th, 7th, 10th, and
11th Circuits have a consistently negative effect on sending a clerk to the
Supreme Court. Interestingly, for model two, which considers only judges
appointed after 1970, all circuits had a negative effect on sending a clerk to
the Court with the exception of the D.C. Circuit, which also had a negative
but not statistically significant relationship. Thus, these models suggest
that for appellate judges overall, being a judge on the D.C. Circuit is a huge
boon to their chances of becoming a feeder judge. However, while these
results represent the entire federal appellate bench, the statistical
significance disappears when one considers just female judges.
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Table 8: Circuit Effects for Female Court of Appeals Judges,
1970-2014
Table 10: Circuit Effects for Female
Court of Appeals Judges, 1970-2014
Circuit (female
judges)

Model 1: Baseline
Model 2: Excludes
(all judges and
Judges Appointed
clerks)
Prior to 1970
1st Circuit
-0.975
-0.853
2nd Circuit
-0.365
-0.37
3rd Circuit
-0.00604
-0.0839
4th Circuit
-1.863*
-1.894*
5th Circuit
0.665
1.183**
6th Circuit
-1.38
-1.405
7th Circuit
-1.226
-1.292
8th Circuit
0
0
9th Circuit
-0.122
-0.483
10th Circuit
0.745
0.728
11th Circuit
-0.569
-0.73
D.C. Circuit
0
0
***Significant of p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

Model 3: Excludes
Self-Feeds
-0.908
-0.335
0.0851
-1.842*
0.688
-1.36
-1.191
0
-0.0947
0.77
-0.561
0

Table 8 demonstrates that the circuit effects of Table 7 do not exist for
the female appellate judges. There were almost no statistically significant
results – only that the Fourth Circuit has a large negative effect and that, for
model two, the Fifth Circuit has a large positive effect on sending a clerk to
the Supreme Court. However, some of the results may be explained by the
lack of women sitting on a particular circuit. For example, there was only
one woman ever appointed to the Eighth Circuit until 2013, when a second
was appointed.126 In fact, as of 2013, it was the least racially and gender
diverse circuit, whereas the Fifth Circuit was the most.127 In addition, the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits did not have a non-white male judge until after
1985. It was not until 1999 that every circuit had at least one female
judge.128 Thus, these results would suggest that while the D.C. Circuit
might have an extremely large effect on sending a clerk to the Supreme
Court, that impact is limited to male appellate judges, further suggesting
that being female prevents judges from receiving benefits of a prestigious
circuit.

126. Sally Kenney at TEDxTU, Why We Have Too Few Women Judges, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvqkabPnZDA (last visited on Dec. 2, 2013).
th
th
127. See id. (discussing the discrepancy between the 5 and 8 Circuit Courts of
Appeals at 04:25).
128. Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on State and
Federal Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84, 88-91 (2001-2002).
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VIII. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AFFILIATION
Although the regression models do not show any statistically significant
effects of party affiliation, I wanted to build on the studies discussed in Part
II(d) and examine whether the political party of the nominating President
can help explain some of the feeding patterns. The pattern for all feeder
judges from 1970 to 2014 shows an extremely high degree of same-party
feeding. And while the data show the same for female feeder judges
specifically, the small sample size makes it more difficult to draw
conclusions. The party of the nominating President is used as a proxy to
determine the ideology of a judge or justice. While this might not be a
perfect indicator since a judge or justice’s actual voting patterns might
deviate, it is a useful metric since there are no “direct, independent
measures of the ideology of hundreds of appeals court judges, nor is it
feasible to obtain them. We can, however, use several indicators to create
an inferential measure of ideology.”129
When one looks at the top feeder judges, they are evenly split between
judges nominated by Republican and Democratic presidents. Table 9
shows the party of the judge’s nominating President and the party of the
nominating President of the justices to whom they have fed.

129. Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions,
38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 679-80 (1994).
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Table 9: Top Feeder Judges and the Political Party of the Justices,
Table 11: Top Feeder Judges1970-2014
and the Ideology of the Justices, 1970-2014
Judge
(Party of
Nominating
President)
Alex Kozinski
(Republican)
J. Harvie Wilkinson
(Republican)
Merrick Garland
(Democrat)
J. Michael Luttig
(Republican)
David Tatel
(Democrat)
Harry Edwards
(Democrat)
Guido Calabresi
(Democrat)
Laurence Silberman
(Republican)
J. Skelly Wright
(Democrat)
Michael Boudin
(Republican)
Total

Total
Clerks

Clerks to Justices
Appointed By a
Republican President

Clerks to Justices
Appointed By a
Democratic President

58

52

6

53

46

7

43

22

21

42

42

0

35

19

16

33

21

12

32

14

18

32

29

3

32

22

10

31

17

14

391

284

107

While this is a subset of the overall data, it shows that at least for
Republicans, there is an overwhelming tendency for these super-feeder
judges to feed clerks to justices of the same Presidential nominating party.
By contrast, four of five of the top Democratic feeders feed more clerks to
Republican justices than fellow Democrats. Furthermore, increasing
partisanship is evident for both parties when one looks at the overall feeder
pool for the period in question.130 Figure 3 shows the percentage of clerks
130. Overall, from 1970 to 2014, Democratic feeder judges sent 208 clerks to
Democratic justices and 361 to Republican justices, a total of 569 clerks. Republican
feeder judges sent 116 clerks to Democratic justices and 647 to Republican justices, a
total of 763 clerks from Republican judges. During the period in question, there were
thirteen Republican justices (Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy, Souter,
O’Connor, Stevens, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Burger, Stewart, and Harlan) and ten
Democratic justices (Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, Kagan, Powell, Marshall,
White, Brennan, Douglas, and Black). If one considers the number of years each
justice served and assumes that each justice hired their maximum of four clerks, there
were a total of 1,044 clerkship positions available with a Republican-nominated justice
and 544 clerkships positions with a Democrat-nominated justice, a ratio of
approximately two to one. See Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme Court Justices by Political
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sent from a feeder judge to a Supreme Court justice of the same nominating
party. Figure 4 illustrates the same phenomenon but only for the female
feeder judges.
Figure 3: Feeding Relationship Between Feeder Judges and Justices
of the Same Nominating Party, 1970-2014
100%	
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Figure 3 shows that there is currently an extremely high rate – over 75%
– of justices hiring clerks from feeder judges of the same Presidential
nominating party. For Democrat-appointed justices, this has increased
dramatically over the last ten years from a low of 16% in 1990 to 1994, to
its current rate of 77%. For Republican-appointed justices, however, their
rate of same-party hiring has actually decreased, averaging 86% from 1970
to 2009 to 78% in the most recent period, but still remains extremely
high.131 Figure 3 provides evidence, consistent with prior studies,132 of
Party Affiliation, 1970-2015 (unpublished data) (on file with author).
131. Id.
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increasing political polarization for Democratic nominees and the
continuation of a high level of same-party feeding for Republican
nominees.
Figure 4: Feeding Between Female Feeder Judges and Justices of the
Same Nominating Party, 1970-2014
100%	
  

Perencentage	
  of	
  Clerks	
  from	
  Same-‐Party	
  Judges	
  	
  

90%	
  
80%	
  
70%	
  
60%	
  
50%	
  
40%	
  
30%	
  
20%	
  
10%	
  
0%	
  

Democratic	
  
Feeder	
  Judge	
  
to	
  Democratic	
  
Justice	
  	
  
Republican	
  
Feeder	
  Judge	
  
to	
  Republican	
  
Justice	
  	
  

Figure 4 shows similarly high rates of same-party feeding for the female
feeder judges to the Supreme Court in recent years. From 2010 to 2014,
Democrat-appointed female feeders sent 83% of their clerks to Democratappointed justices and Republican-appointed female feeders sent 86% of
their clerks to Republican-appointed justices. However, the value of the
data is somewhat limited in this case due to the small sample size. There
was no female Republican feeder until 1992 and she was the only
Republican woman to send a clerk, so the shift looks extremely dramatic as
a result, from 0% to 100%. The Democratic female feeders have a larger

132. See supra Part II(d).
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overall sample size, 82 clerks versus 37 female Republican clerks, but it is
still small. However, for the Democrat-appointed judges, the change over
time is consistent with the change in the overall same-party feeding
practices.
IX. THE IMPACT OF LAG EFFECTS
As I explored what statistical factors might contribute to the
underrepresentation of women as feeder judges, the question arose about
whether lag effects might also contribute. Lag effects are the gap between
when a judge came to the bench and when they began to feed clerk(s) to the
Supreme Court. Under this theory, the underrepresentation could be
explained by the fact that although women are being confirmed to the
Court of Appeals at a steadily increasing rate, it has taken time for that
additional representation to have an impact on from whom the justices hire.
This could make sense in, for example, a framework in which a judge
might have to prove him or herself as having quality clerks before a justice
hires from them.133
In order to explore the lag question, I first determined the lag for each
feeder judge from 1970 to 2014 by subtracting the year of their first feed
from the year of their confirmation. I then determined the average lag by
gender for the 31 female feeders and 167 male feeders. For male judges,
the average length was 7.6 years from being confirmed to the bench to
feeding their first clerk. For women, the average was over a year and half
longer (9.3 years).134 But one judge, Carolyn Dineen King of the Fifth
Circuit, was an outlier among the women – it took thirty-three years for her
to send her first clerk to the Court – and, if excluded from the sample, the
average dropped to 8.87 years.

133. Although the regression results controlling for tenure on the bench call this
assumption into question. See supra Table 4.
134. This gap might be explained by the relatively small sample sizes, but this
disparity could also be another avenue for research. See Alexandra G. Hess, Supreme
Court Justices by Political Party Affiliation, 1970-2015 (unpublished data, on file with
author).
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Figure 5: Lag Effects for Female Court of Appeals Judges,
1970-2014
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In Figure 5, one can see that lag effects are not a sufficient explanation.
While the percentage of women on the federal appellate bench has been
shifted forward nine years to accommodate the calculated lag time, a gap in
female feeder representation still exists; rather, the inflection point of slight
overrepresentation to underrepresentation simply shifted from 1994 to
2003. However, as one can also see, the gap (as shown by the difference
between the blue line representing the proportion of women on the federal
appellate bench and green line representing the lag feeder rate) is smaller
than the actual gap (as represented by the difference between the blue line
and red line). Thus, Figure 5 demonstrates that even if one believes that
lag effects are at play in determining the feeding of clerks to the Supreme
Court, it is not a sufficient explanation.
X. THE RISE OF THE ‘SUPER-FEEDER’
The regression results in Part V showed that being female does not have
a statistically significant effect on a female judge’s chance of feeding one
clerk to the Supreme Court. However, there are large, statistically
significant negative effects on a female judge sending another clerk to the
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Court after she has already sent one. These results would imply that
although women are able to send clerks to the Court, and thus there may
not be a barrier to entry to the feeder pool, there is some factor that is
preventing them from becoming regular feeders or super-feeders. As we
saw in Part IV, after Justice Ginsburg was elevated to the Supreme Court
and Judge Wald retired in the 1990s, individual women have never been
such large feeders and female judges have never regained proportionate
representation. Thus, in this section, I explore what might be causing this
scarcity of women as super-feeders and whether it can help explain the
overall underrepresentation of women as feeder judges compared to their
proportion of the federal appellate bench.
As shown in Table 1, all recent Supreme Court clerks have clerked for
appellate judges, to the point that some have worked for more than one
appellate court judge in hopes of positioning themselves to get a Supreme
Court clerkship. While this might seem like it would increase the chances
of a female appellate judge feeding a clerk to the Supreme Court, the
opposite has proven true. As I have discovered, although prospective
clerks are now essentially required to work for the Court of Appeals before
having a chance at the Court, the judge pool from which the justices are
choosing from is ever narrowing. As noted in Part II, this paper is not the
first statistical examination into the feeder phenomenon; however, it is the
first to examine it through the lens of gender. In 2013, a study found that
from 1976 to 1985 and 1995 to 2004, compared to a random distribution of
appellate judges feeding clerks to the Supreme Court, “the standard
deviation was more than three times as high for the actual distribution as it
was for the random distribution.”135 The study also found a “modest”
strengthening of the feeder system over the time period in question.136
To evaluate this phenomenon, I broke up the Supreme Court clerk pool
into five-year increments. Within those increments, I looked to see how
many appellate judges sent one clerk, two to three clerks, four to five
clerks, and more than six clerks in a given period. I then calculated what
percentage of the total clerk pool each of those categories made up.

135. See Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 29, 31 (noting, however, that their
analysis “is restricted to the Supreme Court law clerks who had prior experience in the
courts of appeals. [They] exclude two subsets of that group, those who served with
retired justices and those who had served with the hiring justice in a court of appeals.”).
136. Id. at 32-33.
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Table
Breakdown
of Feeder
Judges
Number
of Clerks and
Table10:
15: Breakdown
of Feeder
Judges by
Numberby
of Clerks
and Percentage
Percentage
ofClerk
the Clerk
Pool, 1970-2014
of the
Pool, 1970-2014
19701974
Sent 1
18
Clerk
Judges
Percentage 14%
of Clerk
Pool
Sent 2-3
10
Clerks
Percentage 18.6%
of Clerk
Pool
Sent 4-5
3
Clerks
Percentage 10.9%
of Clerk
Pool
Sent 6+
1
Clerks
Percentage 5%
of Clerk
Pool

19751979
12
Judges
8.9%

19801984
25
Judges
16.8%

19851989
19
Judges
11.4%

19901994
27
Judges
14.3%

19951999
30
Judges
17.0%

20002004
25
Judges
14.3%

20052009
17
Judges
8.8%

20102014
18
Judges
9.2%

15

11

17

12

14

14

15

10

25.9%

17.4%

24.7%

13.2%

19.9%

18.3%

17.0%

12.3%

9

8

8

4

6

5

5

9

28.1%

23.5%

21.1%

9.5%

15.3%

12.6%

11.3%

20.5%

2

4

6

11

9

11

14

11

11.9%

24.8%

27.7%

51.3%

44.9%

54.9%

66.0%

69.2%

Table 10 provides clear evidence that although the absolute number of
judges that Supreme Court clerks come from has increased since 1970,
repeat players make up the vast majority of feeder judges. From 1970 to
1974, 5% of Supreme Court clerks (six clerks) came from one judge, David
Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit. However, as Table 10 makes clear, this
monopolization of the Supreme Court clerk pool has only increased over
the last forty-five years. From 2010 to 2014, almost seventy percent of the
entire Supreme Court pool (135 of 195 clerks) came from eleven judges.137
And if one expands the definition of a super-feeder to the four-to-five clerk
category, which means a judge is sending nearly one clerk per term to the
High Court, then almost ninety percent of clerks come from twenty judges.
Whether this near monopolization of the Court by a small number of judges
137. Michael Boudin (First Circuit, six clerks), Merrick Garland (D.C. Circuit,
seventeen clerks), Neil Gorsuch (Tenth Circuit, seven clerks), Thomas Griffith (D.C.
Circuit, nine clerks), Robert Katzmann (Second Circuit, eleven clerks), Brett
Kavanaugh (D.C. Circuit, nineteen clerks), Alex Kozinski (Ninth Circuit, eleven
clerks), Stephen Reinhardt (Ninth Circuit, nine clerks), Jeffrey Sutton (Sixth Circuit,
ten clerks), David Tatel (D.C. Circuit, thirteen clerks), and J. Harvie Wilkinson (Fourth
Circuit, thirteen clerks). See Alexandra G. Hess, Court of Appeals Feeder Judge Data,
1944-2015 (April 13, 2015) (unpublished data, on file with author).
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is a positive development is a matter for debate, its overwhelming presence
is undeniable.
This table also shows that, in absolute numbers, more judges are getting
the opportunity to send a clerk to the Supreme Court. However, these
minor feeder judges are making up an ever-shrinking percentage of the
total clerk pool. In the period from 1970 to 1974 to the most recent period,
the percentage of the clerk pool made up of a judge sending a single clerk
has gone down from 14% to 9.2%. And if one counts minor feeder judges
as a judge that has sent three or fewer clerks in a given five-year period,
then the percentage of the clerk pool has gone down from 32.6% to 21.5%
in the same period. Table 10, therefore, tells us that the clerk pool is
becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few judges, but how
does that play out along gender lines?
Table
11: Breakdown of Feeder Judges by Number of Clerks and
Table 16: Breakdown of Feeder Judges by Number of Clerks and Gender of
Genderthe
of Judge,
the Judge,
1970-2014
1970-2014
19701974
18
Judges
0
(0%)
18
(100%)
10

19751979
12
Judges
0
(0%)
12
(100%)
15

19801984
25
Judges
0
(0%)
25
(100%)
11

19851989
19
Judges
0
(0%)
19
(100%)
17

1
(10%)

0
(0%)

1
(9.1%)

2
0
(11.7%) (0%)

Male
Judges

9
(90%)

15
(100%)

10
15
12
(90.9%) (88.3%) (100%)

10
9
11
8
(71.4%) (64.3%) (73.3%) (80%)

Sent
4-5
Clerks
Female
Judges
Male
Judges
Sent
6+
Clerks
Female
Judges
Male
Judges

3

9

8

8

4

6

5

5

9

0
(0%)
3
(100%)
1

1
(11.1%)
8
(88.9%)
2

1
(14.3%)
7
(85.7%)
4

1
(14.3%)
7
(85.7%)
6

0
(0%)
4
(100%)
11

0
(0%)
6
(100%)
9

0
(0%)
5
(100%)
11

0
(0%)
5
(100%)
14

2
(22.2%)
7
(77.8%)
11

0
(0%)
1
(100%)

0
(0%)
2
(100%)

0
(0%)
4
(100%)

1
(16.7%)
5
(83.3%)

2
(18.2%)
9
(81.8%)

0
(0%)
9
(100%)

0
(0%)
11
(100%)

0
(0%)
14
(100%)

0
(0%)
11
(100%)

Sent 1
Clerk
Female
Judges
Male
Judges
Sent
2-3
Clerks
Female
Judges

19901994
27
Judges
7
(25.9%)
20
(74.1%)
12

19951999
30
Judges
5
(16.7%)
25
(83.3%)
14

20002004
25
Judges
6
(24%)
19
(76%)
14

20052009
17
Judges
5
(29.4%)
12
(70.6%)
15

20102014
18
Judges
7
(38.9%)
11
(61.1%)
10

4
5
4
2
(28.6%) (35.7%) (26.7%) (20%)

Table 11 shows the gender breakdown of judges who have sent clerks to
the Court in a given five-year period. While women were 3.1% of feeder
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judges in the period from 1970-1974, their presence has increased to 22.9%
of feeder judges from 2010 to 2014. But this is only in terms of absolute
numbers, not in terms of the percentage of Supreme Court clerks that come
from female judges. In fact, this table shows that, currently, women are
essentially shut out of the elite feeder pool: they are excluded entirely from
the six-plus clerk category, which makes up almost 70% of the clerk pool.
Additionally, of the twenty judges that sent almost 90% of the Supreme
Court clerk pool in the last five years, there are only two female judges.138
And this is an improvement from the previous two five-year periods when
female judges made up zero percent of the four-to-five and six-plus
categories, which sent 77.3% and 67.5% of the clerk pool, respectively. In
fact, female judges have only been three of the sixty-nine judges who have
sent six or more clerks to the Court in any of the measured five-year
periods: Judge Wald (D.C. Circuit, six clerks) in 1985 to 1989 and then she
was joined by then-Judge Ginsburg (D.C. Circuit, ten clerks)139 in 1990 to
1994.
As Tables 10 and 11 point out, women are sending clerks to the
Supreme Court, but they are being shut out of the elite-level of feeding.
While I will address the reputational and other intangible consequences of
this exclusion, it also seems likely to contribute to women’s
underrepresentation as feeder judges.140 To examine this, I took my
existing list of feeder judges and deleted any judge that sent an average of
one clerk per term in a given five-year period, who I originally defined as a
super-feeder. Although the previous tables designated a judge who sent six
or more clerks in a different category from those that sent four to five, I
used the one clerk per term average for this purpose to be consistent with
other studies on feeder judges.141 I then plotted the resulting list of judges
on a graph of the actual percentage of female feeders and the percentage of
women on the federal appellate bench.

138. The women are Edith Jones (Fifth Circuit, five clerks) and Janice Rogers
Brown (D.C. Circuit, five clerks). See id.
139. In fact, these are the most clerks a female judge has ever sent in a five-year
period. This further contributes to my point in Part V that once Justice Ginsburg was
elevated and Judge Wald retired, no woman has been able to reach their level of
feeding.
140. See infra Conclusion.
141. See Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 42.
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Figure 6: Female Judges as Feeders with Super-Feeders Removed,
1970-2014
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Figure 6 provides clear evidence that by removing the ‘super-feeders,’
female judges’ representation increases dramatically. In fact, they are
represented equal to or greater than their proportion of the federal bench in
twenty-five of the forty-five years covered. This graph reflects the
increasing number of women as one-off feeders. And whereas women
never made up more than 30% of feeder judges in the original graph, in
both 1994 and 2012 women are 50% of feeder judges. Yet, while women
are now represented to a much higher degree, it took removing the feeder
judges for almost 90% of the clerk pool to achieve this level of parity. This
graph demonstrates that women can be equitably represented as feeder
judges, but are only allowed to be so for 10% of the clerk pool. In this
system, individual male judges are rewarded for consistency and quality,
while female judges are treated like interchangeable anomalies.
XI. CONCLUSION
This paper makes it clear that the rise of the super-feeder system has
been a key contributor to the exclusion of women as feeder judges to the
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Supreme Court. Initially, when Chief Justice Burger began requiring
prospective clerks to have appellate court experience, female judges had
equal or greater representation as feeders compared to their proportion on
the appellate bench. However, as time went on, and especially when Judge
Ginsburg became Justice Ginsburg, women were gradually shut out of the
elite feeder pool. As a result, despite making up more than 24% of the
Court of Appeals, women currently account for only 8% of feeder judges.
This underrepresentation of women as feeder judges is part of a pattern
of women’s absence or marginalization in other elite areas of the law, such
as law firm partnership, Supreme Court clerks, Supreme Court litigators,
federal judges, among others.142 In fact, one could argue that the feeder
system is partly responsible for the underrepresentation of female clerks on
the Supreme Court. As mentioned, whereas women currently represent
half of all law student graduates, they are only one-third of the Supreme
Court clerk pool. One study found:
Suppose that we define the major feeder judges as those who have
supplied the Justices with at least ten law clerks during this period.
Among these judges, the 2006 proportion of female clerks from the nine
major feeder schools was only 32%. If we use a more lenient criterion
for identifying the feeder judges, namely those who have supplied the
Justices with at least five law clerks during the 1989-2005 period, the
proportion becomes 35%. In sum, if the feeder system is used in
defining the highly qualified applicant pool, then roughly one-third of
143
that pool seems to consist of women.

The data show that a similar pattern still exists. Using these two
definitions of feeder judges, about one-third of the clerks they feed are
women.144 This means that although the percentage of women clerking for
the Supreme Court has increased, the feeder judges have not increased, and
have potentially decreased, their proportion of female clerks since 1989.
This is worrisome because these feeder judges are feeding an ever-larger
percentage of the clerk pool, and if they are not able to hire more women or
convince the justices to take a greater number of female clerks, it is unclear
how this gap will ever be closed. In fact, Justice Souter seems to place the
onus for increasing the representation of women and minorities as clerks on
the feeder judges, “We are creatures of our feeder system. They are going
to push minority high achievers in a way they have not before. We are

142. See Smith, supra note 12.
143. Kaye, supra note 17, at 418-19.
144. Id.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss1/2

44

Hess: The Collapse of the House that Ruth Built: The Impact of the Feeder System on Female Judges and the Federal Judiciary, 1970-2014
HESS 10/8/15 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/4/15 11:03 AM

COLLAPSE OF HOUSE THAT RUTH BUILT

105

going to see the fruits of some pushing.”145 Yet, at least for women, it does
not appear that this pushing has occurred among the ranks of elite feeders.
Thus, certain voices are kept out of the Supreme Court146 and certain
groups are not reaping the benefits associated with a Supreme Court
clerkship.
But there are also intangible factors driving the feeder pool. Some have
argued that the feeder judges are simply “well known and well respected in
their professions” and that “[m]any of the feeder judges are among the
most outstanding and well-known judges of their generation.”147 And
while that may be true, there is no evidence supporting the fact that feeder
judges, and super-feeders in particular, are better judges or produce better
quality clerks. Rather, the consensus of academics seems to be that the
main drivers are personal relationships:
Acquaintanceship [or friendship] undoubtedly helps to create feeder
relationships, and different justices are acquainted with different judges.
In turn, geography—the circuit of a justice’s prior service as a judge or
current service as circuit justice—can affect acquaintanceship.
Inevitably, justices differ in their assessments of particular judges and,
thus, in their willingness to hire clerks who have worked for those
judges. Further, feeder relationships are probably path dependent to a
degree: if a justice employs a few clerks who have served a particular
judge and is impressed with their work, the justice may be inclined to
148
choose additional clerks from the same judge.

For the most part, these qualities are vague and immeasurable, especially
the networking effects. But some of these factors seem to inherently favor
male judges. For example, a judge being a prior Supreme Court clerk has a
huge positive effect on feeding. But for women, who currently represent
145. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 26, at 98.
146. Whether or not Supreme Court clerks actually have an influence is hotly

contested. Compare H.W. Perry, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1, 69 (President & Fellows of Harv. Coll. 1991)
(interviewing past Supreme Court law clerks to show that clerks’ influence varies from
Justice to Justice), with Timothy R. Johnson, David R. Stras & Ryan C. Black, Advice
from the Bench (Memo): Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 98
MARQ. L. REV. 21, 25 (2014) (analyzing empirical and anecdotal evidence to conclude
that clerks do have influence over both substantive decisions made by justices and over
the opinion drafting process), with Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk
Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: an Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 51, 53 (2008-09) (“[c]lerks ideological predilections exert an additional, and
not insubstantial, influence on the Justices’ decisions on the merits.”).
147. Kaye, supra note 17, at 418 n.40.
148. Baum and Ditslear, supra note 6, at 27.
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only 33% of the clerk pool and even less in earlier periods, there were more
limited opportunities to get these jobs and forge these bonds with the
justices. Thus, there is no Supreme Court clerk network that they can rely
on for their clerks. This may explain why there is no positive effect for
women between being a former Supreme Court clerk and sending a clerk of
one’s own – there were limited opportunities for the current female judges
to have been clerks. This same problem applies to geography: certain
circuits might provide an advantage, but women may not have a substantial
presence on the circuit and, therefore, are further excluded from becoming
feeders. For example, the D.C. Circuit, which is the only circuit with a
positive effect on sending a clerk to the Supreme Court,149 has eighteen
sitting judges, only five of whom are women. This small presence is
further exacerbated by the fact that so far, being on the DC Circuit has not
had a statistically significant positive effect on any of their female
member’s feeding, although it is possible recent female appointments could
change this pattern.
Finally, based on my regression results in Part V, this notion of “path
dependence” clearly seems to favor men. For female judges, sending a
previous clerk to the Supreme Court has a large and statistically significant
negative effect with sending another clerk. For the feeder pool overall,
however, it is the single largest effect on sending a future clerk. Is the
reason that when women send a clerk to the Court, the clerks are just of
lower quality? This seems like an unlikely explanation. Rather, the
extremely small pool of super-feeders leaves room for female judges to
send one clerk, maybe two, but excludes them from this competition for the
prestige that comes with being an elite feeder judge. Whether it is good
that prestige flows from feeding to the Court is an issue best left for another
study. But the fact is, women are being shut out of what is considered to be
a position of status. It seems that even though the federal appellate bench
is becoming more diverse, the pool of power players is getting increasingly
narrow and continuing to replicate traditional hierarchies of privilege. And
it is creating a vicious cycle in which “feeder” faculty members150 are
trying to send their best students to a group of almost exclusively white,
male feeder judges151 who then hope to send their clerks to a majority
white, male Supreme Court.

149. See supra Part VI.
150. See Kozinski, supra note 52, at 1717-18 (“Professors are not above the

fray. . . . Professors, too, have reputations to safeguard. An unreliable recommendation
or other kind of perfidy will weaken the force of a professor’s recommendation in
future clerkship seasons.”); Kaye, supra note 17, at 415 n.18.
151. See Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 128, at 88-91.
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